Title:
Reid on Color
Authors:
Ganson, Todd
Abstract:
In his most sustained discussion of colour, Inquiry ch. 6, sects. iv–v, Reid argues that modern philosophers have made an important discovery about colour and an important mistake. Modern philosophers are right that colour experience involves an internal object of awareness, what Reid refers to either as ‘the sensation of colour’ or as ‘the appearance of colour’; they are wrong in supposing that our everyday colour terms are names of colour sensations. Both of Reid’s central claims about colour have come under attack recently. Some have complained that Reid should not have posited an internal object of awareness, something distinct from the colour seen. Others more sympathetic with Reid’s distinction between sensation and perception have questioned his thesis that our everyday colour terms are names of the surface properties of objects that cause our colour sensations rather than names of the colour sensations themselves. In what follows I will suggest that much of Reid’s reasoning on these issues is defensible and important. This paper is divided into two parts. In the rst part I explore Reid’s arguments for the existence of colour sensations. In the second I examine his claim that our colour terms are not names of our colour sensations.
Citation:
Ganson, Todd. 2002. "Reid on Colour." British Journal for the History of Philosphy 10(2): 231-242.
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis for the British Society for the History of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
2002-05
Department:
Philosophy
Type:
Article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1080/09608780210122473
Additional Links:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09608780210122473
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/603501

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGanson, Todden
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-22T13:19:13Zen
dc.date.available2016-03-22T13:19:13Zen
dc.date.issued2002-05en
dc.identifier.citationGanson, Todd. 2002. "Reid on Colour." British Journal for the History of Philosphy 10(2): 231-242.en
dc.identifier.issn0960-8788en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/603501en
dc.description.abstractIn his most sustained discussion of colour, Inquiry ch. 6, sects. iv–v, Reid argues that modern philosophers have made an important discovery about colour and an important mistake. Modern philosophers are right that colour experience involves an internal object of awareness, what Reid refers to either as ‘the sensation of colour’ or as ‘the appearance of colour’; they are wrong in supposing that our everyday colour terms are names of colour sensations. Both of Reid’s central claims about colour have come under attack recently. Some have complained that Reid should not have posited an internal object of awareness, something distinct from the colour seen. Others more sympathetic with Reid’s distinction between sensation and perception have questioned his thesis that our everyday colour terms are names of the surface properties of objects that cause our colour sensations rather than names of the colour sensations themselves. In what follows I will suggest that much of Reid’s reasoning on these issues is defensible and important. This paper is divided into two parts. In the rst part I explore Reid’s arguments for the existence of colour sensations. In the second I examine his claim that our colour terms are not names of our colour sensations.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis for the British Society for the History of Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09608780210122473en
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09608780210122473en
dc.subject.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleReid on Coloren_US
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophyen
dc.identifier.volume10en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage231en_US
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to British Journal for the History of Philosophyen
All Items in The Five Colleges of Ohio Digital Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.