Vote Suppression and Insecure Property Rights

Title:
Vote Suppression and Insecure Property Rights
Authors:
Castañeda Dower, Paul; Pfutze, Tobias
Abstract:
While it is commonly understood that land is a political tool, there is surprisingly little empirical research on how insecure property rights affect political outcomes. In this paper, we show how a dominant political party can use insecure property rights to ensure politically compliant voter behavior and how this power is frustrated after the introduction of a land certification program. We test this hypothesis on data covering 10,000 Mexican municipal elections during the country's democratic,transition. Exploiting the gradual rollout of a large-scale land certification program, we find that land titles significantly raised the number of votes for the main opposition parties. Importantly, this effect disappears once the dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has already lost at least one election in the municipality. These results provide an additional explanation of the PRI's downfall and, more generally, illuminate the relationship between political power, institutions and resource allocation. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Citation:
Dower, Paul Castaneda, and Tobias Pfutze. 2015. "Vote Suppression and Insecure Property Rights." Journal of Development Economics 114: 1-19.
Publisher:
Elsevier
DATE ISSUED:
2015-05
Department:
Economics
Type:
Article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.003
Additional Links:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304387814001229
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/594418

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorCastañeda Dower, Paulen
dc.contributor.authorPfutze, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-20T14:59:46Zen
dc.date.available2016-01-20T14:59:46Zen
dc.date.issued2015-05en
dc.identifier.citationDower, Paul Castaneda, and Tobias Pfutze. 2015. "Vote Suppression and Insecure Property Rights." Journal of Development Economics 114: 1-19.en
dc.identifier.issn0304-3878en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/594418en
dc.description.abstractWhile it is commonly understood that land is a political tool, there is surprisingly little empirical research on how insecure property rights affect political outcomes. In this paper, we show how a dominant political party can use insecure property rights to ensure politically compliant voter behavior and how this power is frustrated after the introduction of a land certification program. We test this hypothesis on data covering 10,000 Mexican municipal elections during the country's democratic,transition. Exploiting the gradual rollout of a large-scale land certification program, we find that land titles significantly raised the number of votes for the main opposition parties. Importantly, this effect disappears once the dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has already lost at least one election in the municipality. These results provide an additional explanation of the PRI's downfall and, more generally, illuminate the relationship between political power, institutions and resource allocation. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.003en
dc.relation.urlhttp://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304387814001229en
dc.subject.departmentEconomicsen_US
dc.titleVote Suppression and Insecure Property Rightsen_US
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Development Economicsen
dc.subject.keywordProperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordClientismen_US
dc.subject.keywordLand reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordMexicoen_US
dc.subject.keywordInstitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)en_US
dc.subject.keywordEjidoen_US
dc.identifier.volume114en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1en_US
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to Journal of Development Economicsen
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