Are Color Experiences Representational?

Title:
Are Color Experiences Representational?
Authors:
Ganson, Todd
Abstract:
The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. I consider various ways of trying to avoid the objection, and find all of the responses wanting. My conclusion is that we have reason to be skeptical of the orthodox view that color experiences are constitutively representational.
Citation:
Ganson, Todd. October 2013. “Are Color Experiences Representational?” Philosophical Studies 166(1): 1-20.
Publisher:
Springer Verlag
DATE ISSUED:
2013
Department:
Philosophy
Type:
Article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1007/s11098-012-0018-1
Additional Links:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-012-0018-1
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/332547

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGanson, Todden
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-09T12:04:54Zen
dc.date.available2014-10-09T12:04:54Zen
dc.date.issued2013en
dc.identifier.citationGanson, Todd. October 2013. “Are Color Experiences Representational?” Philosophical Studies 166(1): 1-20.en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/332547en
dc.description.abstractThe dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. I consider various ways of trying to avoid the objection, and find all of the responses wanting. My conclusion is that we have reason to be skeptical of the orthodox view that color experiences are constitutively representational.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-012-0018-1en_US
dc.relation.urlhttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-012-0018-1en
dc.subject.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.titleAre Color Experiences Representational?en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.subject.keywordColoren
dc.subject.keywordExperienceen
dc.subject.keywordPerceptionen
dc.subject.keywordColor constancyen
dc.subject.keywordLightness constancyen
dc.subject.keywordColor appearanceen
dc.subject.keywordRepresentationen
dc.subject.keywordColoren_US
dc.subject.keywordColor constancyen_US
dc.subject.keywordLightness constancyen_US
dc.subject.keywordColor appearanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperienceen_US
dc.subject.keywordPerceptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordRepresentationen_US
dc.identifier.volume166en
dc.identifier.issue1en
dc.identifier.startpage1en
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