Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration

Title:
Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration
Authors:
Pfutze, Tobias
Abstract:
Most research on the effects of international migration on democratic institutions in sending countries focuses on how emigration changes the civic and democratic values of those left behind. Little attention has been given to how the additional income provided by migrant remittances alters the incentive structure of the political actors involved and how this will affect political outcomes. This paper develops a voting model that accounts for the effect of higher income through remittances and shows that its expected effects on voter turnout patterns differ in important ways from those of improved civic values. Taking these predictions to the data, it is shown that, for the case of Mexican municipal elections over the year 2000–2002 period, the empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that international remittances had a positive effect on electoral competitiveness in Mexico by reducing the clientelistic power of the formerly dominant state party (Institutional Revolutionary Party). This result is robust to the use of instrumental variables.
Citation:
Pfutze, Tobias. June 2014. “Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration.” International Studies Quarterly 58(2): 295-307.
Publisher:
Wiley for the International Studies Association
DATE ISSUED:
2014
Department:
Economics
Type:
Article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1111/isqu.12072
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/332424

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorPfutze, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-09T12:03:27Z-
dc.date.available2014-10-09T12:03:27Z-
dc.date.issued2014en
dc.identifier.citationPfutze, Tobias. June 2014. “Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration.” International Studies Quarterly 58(2): 295-307.en
dc.identifier.issn0020-8833en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/332424-
dc.description.abstractMost research on the effects of international migration on democratic institutions in sending countries focuses on how emigration changes the civic and democratic values of those left behind. Little attention has been given to how the additional income provided by migrant remittances alters the incentive structure of the political actors involved and how this will affect political outcomes. This paper develops a voting model that accounts for the effect of higher income through remittances and shows that its expected effects on voter turnout patterns differ in important ways from those of improved civic values. Taking these predictions to the data, it is shown that, for the case of Mexican municipal elections over the year 2000–2002 period, the empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that international remittances had a positive effect on electoral competitiveness in Mexico by reducing the clientelistic power of the formerly dominant state party (Institutional Revolutionary Party). This result is robust to the use of instrumental variables.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherWiley for the International Studies Associationen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/isqu.12072en
dc.subject.departmentEconomicsen
dc.titleClientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migrationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalInternational Studies Quarterlyen
dc.identifier.volume58en
dc.identifier.issue2en
dc.identifier.startpage295en
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