Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution

Title:
Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution
Authors:
Suter, Jordan; Segerson, Kathleen; Vossler, Christian A.; Poe, Gregory L.
Abstract:
This article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary-threat approach, which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance. In particular, we develop an "endogenous" voluntary-threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and eliminate zero-abatement equilibria. Experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the "exogenous" approach of Segerson and Wu (2006) suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes.
Citation:
Suter, Jordan F., Kathleen Segerson, Christian A. Vossler, and Gregory L. Poe. 2010. "Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution." American Journal Of Agricultural Economics 92(4): 1195-1213.
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DATE ISSUED:
2010-07
Department:
Environmental Studies
Type:
Article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1093/ajae/aaq042
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/309946

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorSuter, Jordanen_US
dc.contributor.authorSegerson, Kathleenen_US
dc.contributor.authorVossler, Christian A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPoe, Gregory L.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-23T16:21:48Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-23T16:21:48Zen
dc.date.issued2010-07en
dc.identifier.citationSuter, Jordan F., Kathleen Segerson, Christian A. Vossler, and Gregory L. Poe. 2010. "Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution." American Journal Of Agricultural Economics 92(4): 1195-1213.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-9092en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/309946en
dc.description.abstractThis article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary-threat approach, which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance. In particular, we develop an "endogenous" voluntary-threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and eliminate zero-abatement equilibria. Experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the "exogenous" approach of Segerson and Wu (2006) suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/ajae/aaq042en
dc.subject.departmentEnvironmental Studiesen_US
dc.titleVoluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollutionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.journalAmerican Journal Of Agricultural Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordAmbient taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordLaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNonpoint source pollution controlen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary-threat approachen_US
dc.identifier.volume92en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1195en_US
All Items in The Five Colleges of Ohio Digital Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.