Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters

Title:
Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters
Authors:
Suter, Jordan; Vossler, Christian A.; Poe, Gregory L.; Segerson, Kathleen
Abstract:
This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents can communicate, emissions are considerably below the optimum, but we show that the tax function can be scaled to achieve social efficiency. Finally, by disaggregating the overall efficiency measure, we show that changing the pollution threshold that triggers the tax increases the inefficiency resulting from variation in agent-level decisions, but does not affect average emissions.
Citation:
Suter, Jordan, C. A. Vossler, G. L. Poe, and K. Segerson. 2008. "Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters." American Journal Of Agricultural Economics 90(1): 86-102.
Publisher:
Oxford University Press for Agricultural and Applied Economics Assoication
DATE ISSUED:
2008
Department:
Economics/ Environmental Studies
Type:
article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01055.x
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/309275

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorSuter, Jordanen_US
dc.contributor.authorVossler, Christian A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPoe, Gregory L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSegerson, Kathleenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-23T16:06:08Z-
dc.date.available2013-12-23T16:06:08Z-
dc.date.issued2008en
dc.identifier.citationSuter, Jordan, C. A. Vossler, G. L. Poe, and K. Segerson. 2008. "Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters." American Journal Of Agricultural Economics 90(1): 86-102.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-9092en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/309275-
dc.description.abstractThis article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents can communicate, emissions are considerably below the optimum, but we show that the tax function can be scaled to achieve social efficiency. Finally, by disaggregating the overall efficiency measure, we show that changing the pollution threshold that triggers the tax increases the inefficiency resulting from variation in agent-level decisions, but does not affect average emissions.en_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press for Agricultural and Applied Economics Assoicationen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01055.x-
dc.subject.departmentEconomics/ Environmental Studiesen_US
dc.titleExperiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Pollutersen_US
dc.typearticleen_US
dc.identifier.journalAmerican Journal Of Agricultural Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordDamage-based taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordLaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNonlinear versus linear tax mechanismsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNonpoint source pollutionen_US
dc.identifier.volume90en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage86en_US
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