Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief

Title:
Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief
Authors:
Ganson, Dorit
Abstract:
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.
Citation:
Ganson, Dorit. 2008. "Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief." Philosophical Studies 139(3): 441-458.
Publisher:
Springer Verlag
DATE ISSUED:
2008
Department:
Philosophy
Type:
article
PUBLISHED VERSION:
10.1007/s11098-007-9133-9
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/11282/309192

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGanson, Doriten_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-23T16:04:22Z-
dc.date.available2013-12-23T16:04:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008en
dc.identifier.citationGanson, Dorit. 2008. "Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief." Philosophical Studies 139(3): 441-458.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11282/309192-
dc.description.abstractEvidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-007-9133-9-
dc.subject.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleEvidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Beliefen_US
dc.typearticleen_US
dc.identifier.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.volume139en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.startpage441en_US
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