Title:
Episteme Vol. XX
Authors:
Costello, Willie; Mooneyham, B.D.; Dreier, Douglas; Blomfield, Megan
Abstract:
Costello, "The Place of Book X in Plato's Republic," 6-23. // Here is a new interpretation of Book X of the Republic, which understands this book in relation to the Republic’s central defense of justice and the virtuous life. A metaphysical argument uses the allegory of the cave to understand the problem of poetry as imitation. Appearances can be deceiving; truth need not look like popular wisdom. An ethical argument explains that poetry encourages us to act on the urging of the non-rational part of our soul, thereby diminishing the rational part. Furthermore, since the way our souls react to poetry is as real and as genuine as actual experience, we ought not to respect nor even to listen to the far-from-excellent characters of popular poetry. And so, when read between the lines, Book X asks the reader to act on the wisdom imparted in Books I-IX.

Mooneyham, "A Gap in Kim's Eliminative Argument for Reductionism," 24-35. // This paper traces the logical movements in Jaegwon Kim’s philosophy of mind addressed to physicalists. To start, a brief background to the contemporary debate between substance dualists, property dualists, and reductionists is provided. The author then argues that Kim uses inconsistent logic in his argument against non-reductive physicalism, compared with his argument against substance dualism: the pairing problem. It turns out that Kim fails to eliminate substance dualism as a possible theory of mind, in particular as an explanation of mental causation. The author offers a separate argument that would improve Kim’s case.

Dreier, "Rawls on Abortion: Adapting his Theory of Justice to the Controversy," 36-49. // Rawls does not have to be explicit about gender or sex issues to be on the pro-choice side of the abortion debate. If we examine Rawls’ principles of justice and his veil of ignorance, we recognize that his logic rips through much of the usual justification for pro-life legality, even in the famous Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade. Since a person behind the veil might be a pregnant woman, cannot rely on specific moral beliefs, and must be able to have self-respect when the veil is lifted; Rawls is unmistakably pro-choice. Furthermore, in terms of other in vogue political philosophies, neither utilitarianism nor Nozickian political philosophy are better equipped to handle this thorny issue.

Blomfield, "Norm-Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem," 50-69. // How successful is Allan Gibbard’s attempt to solve the Frege-Geach problem for moral non-cognitivism? This author argues that Gibbard is on the right track with his formalism, but is missing an argument about inconsistency that matches the strength of truth-functional logic. The paper includes discussions of non-cognitivism, the Frege-Geach problem, a summary of Gibbard’s argumentation, and summaries of various strong criticisms of Gibbard’s efforts. The author emphasizes the weakness of relying on practical considerations when it comes to consistency between all possible normative moral judgments, yet supports Schroeder’s insight that might help to improve Gibbard’s reasoning.
Advisors:
Bradner, Alexandra
Editors:
Henricks, Megan
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/759; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorBradner, Alexandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorCostello, Willieen_US
dc.contributor.authorMooneyham, B.D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDreier, Douglasen_US
dc.contributor.authorBlomfield, Meganen_US
dc.contributor.editorHenricks, Meganen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:15Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:41:35Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:15Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:41:35Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/759en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractCostello, "The Place of Book X in Plato's Republic," 6-23. // Here is a new interpretation of Book X of the Republic, which understands this book in relation to the Republic’s central defense of justice and the virtuous life. A metaphysical argument uses the allegory of the cave to understand the problem of poetry as imitation. Appearances can be deceiving; truth need not look like popular wisdom. An ethical argument explains that poetry encourages us to act on the urging of the non-rational part of our soul, thereby diminishing the rational part. Furthermore, since the way our souls react to poetry is as real and as genuine as actual experience, we ought not to respect nor even to listen to the far-from-excellent characters of popular poetry. And so, when read between the lines, Book X asks the reader to act on the wisdom imparted in Books I-IX.en_US
dc.description.abstractMooneyham, "A Gap in Kim's Eliminative Argument for Reductionism," 24-35. // This paper traces the logical movements in Jaegwon Kim’s philosophy of mind addressed to physicalists. To start, a brief background to the contemporary debate between substance dualists, property dualists, and reductionists is provided. The author then argues that Kim uses inconsistent logic in his argument against non-reductive physicalism, compared with his argument against substance dualism: the pairing problem. It turns out that Kim fails to eliminate substance dualism as a possible theory of mind, in particular as an explanation of mental causation. The author offers a separate argument that would improve Kim’s case.en_US
dc.description.abstractDreier, "Rawls on Abortion: Adapting his Theory of Justice to the Controversy," 36-49. // Rawls does not have to be explicit about gender or sex issues to be on the pro-choice side of the abortion debate. If we examine Rawls’ principles of justice and his veil of ignorance, we recognize that his logic rips through much of the usual justification for pro-life legality, even in the famous Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade. Since a person behind the veil might be a pregnant woman, cannot rely on specific moral beliefs, and must be able to have self-respect when the veil is lifted; Rawls is unmistakably pro-choice. Furthermore, in terms of other in vogue political philosophies, neither utilitarianism nor Nozickian political philosophy are better equipped to handle this thorny issue.en_US
dc.description.abstractBlomfield, "Norm-Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem," 50-69. // How successful is Allan Gibbard’s attempt to solve the Frege-Geach problem for moral non-cognitivism? This author argues that Gibbard is on the right track with his formalism, but is missing an argument about inconsistency that matches the strength of truth-functional logic. The paper includes discussions of non-cognitivism, the Frege-Geach problem, a summary of Gibbard’s argumentation, and summaries of various strong criticisms of Gibbard’s efforts. The author emphasizes the weakness of relying on practical considerations when it comes to consistency between all possible normative moral judgments, yet supports Schroeder’s insight that might help to improve Gibbard’s reasoning.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectPlato.en_US
dc.subjectAncienten_US
dc.subjectPoetryen_US
dc.subjectJusticeen_US
dc.subjectImitationen_US
dc.subjectTruthen_US
dc.subjectIgnoranceen_US
dc.subjectVirtueen_US
dc.subjectKim, Jaegwonen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind.en_US
dc.subjectPhysicalismen_US
dc.subjectDualismen_US
dc.subjectSupervenienceen_US
dc.subjectReductionismen_US
dc.subjectRawls, John, 1921-2002en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Lawen_US
dc.subjectAbortionen_US
dc.subjectPoliticsen_US
dc.subjectPersonhooden_US
dc.subjectVeil of Ignoranceen_US
dc.subjectGibbard, Allanen_US
dc.subjectBlackburn, Simonen_US
dc.subjectGeach, P. T. (Peter Thomas), 1916-en_US
dc.subjectEthics.en_US
dc.subjectAnalyticen_US
dc.subjectNon-Cognitivismen_US
dc.subjectLogicen_US
dc.subjectExpressivismen_US
dc.subjectSemanticsen_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.subjectNormativityen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XXen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDailey, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRosenberg, Alexen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHale, Melanieen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHavens, Kimbreyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardMorrison, Vaughnen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardPeterson, Erinen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardSherrell, Lauraen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardStevens, Susanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardStromstedt, Christopheren_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardWhissel, Daveen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardZak, Lizen_US
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
Creative Commons
All Items in The Five Colleges of Ohio Digital Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.