Title:
Episteme Vol. XIX
Authors:
Dugas, Micah; Zimmerman, Jill; Feiman, Roman; Trochimchuk, Stephen
Abstract:
Dugas, "Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence as a Psychological Test of Action," 6-22. // How ought we to make sense of the doctrine of eternal recurrence? First of all, it follows Nietzsche’s attack on traditional morality, and is an answer to the question: What takes the place of immortality in a world in which God is Dead? But the doctrine is not meant to be a metaphysical hypothesis—such a thing would be at odds with Nietzsche’s thoughts on memory, choice, and the “laws” of nature. Nor is it dogmatic or like Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Rather, “eternal recurrence” is meant to help serve the powerful human who is not like the rest of society—the overman. We must defend the psychological test interpretation of the eternal recurrence, because it better harmonizes with Nietzsche’s body of work.

Zimmerman, "Forcing Freedom: Applying Mill's Principles of Liberty in an International Society," 23-33. // The author extends Mill’s liberty theory to contemporary international politics, specifically in relation to liberal intervention theory. The author tries to interpret Mill in the spirit of some popular liberal theories, but argues for why such an interpretation, which draws an analogy between the role of an individual and the role of a state’s government, would not be supported by Mill himself. For Mill, the individual is the central moral force, which is not simply in an appeal to prevent against harm toward a particular entity (as with looking-out for one particular nation among many in the international community). Even factoring in Mill’s argument about the Mormon community does not keep Mill from having a relatively wide theory for the acceptability of foreign intervention.

Feiman, "Possible Worlds and Counterfactuals: Critique and Commentary on Complicating Causation," 34-40. // This article focuses on David Lewis’s theory of causation. The author provides helpful clarity regarding the difference between material and counterfactual conditions, the distinction between causal dependence and causation, and the nature of possible world theories in general. Although it is found that Lewis does not fall victim to the problems of metaphysical impossibility or preemption, his theory still relies too much on mere intuition. Lewis’ solution is not very convincing when it comes to the slippery issue of causation.

Trochimchuk, "The Natural Philosophies of Descartes and Newton: A Kuhnian Reflection," 41-59. // Kuhn can be used to describe shifts in science other than just the Copernican Revolution. This paper argues that Newton’s theory of mechanics, especially the notion of gravitational force, only appears to be responding to “deficiencies” in Descartes’ corpuscularism. In reality, Newton’s theory represents a paradigm shift. To make his case, the author first supplies useful summaries of Descartes’ and Newton’s sciences, as well as Kuhn’s meta-scientific project. The author then emphasizes that on issues like gravity and mass, the Cartesian and Newtonian systems of science hold each other’s theoretical concepts to be senseless when judged from within their own. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions provides an appropriate lens through which to understand this stage in the history of science.
Advisors:
Bradner, Alexandra
Editors:
Rozman, Stephanie
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/758; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorBradner, Alexandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorDugas, Micahen_US
dc.contributor.authorZimmerman, Jillen_US
dc.contributor.authorFeiman, Romanen_US
dc.contributor.authorTrochimchuk, Stephenen_US
dc.contributor.editorRozman, Stephanieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:14Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:41:20Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:14Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:41:20Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/758en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractDugas, "Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence as a Psychological Test of Action," 6-22. // How ought we to make sense of the doctrine of eternal recurrence? First of all, it follows Nietzsche’s attack on traditional morality, and is an answer to the question: What takes the place of immortality in a world in which God is Dead? But the doctrine is not meant to be a metaphysical hypothesis—such a thing would be at odds with Nietzsche’s thoughts on memory, choice, and the “laws” of nature. Nor is it dogmatic or like Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Rather, “eternal recurrence” is meant to help serve the powerful human who is not like the rest of society—the overman. We must defend the psychological test interpretation of the eternal recurrence, because it better harmonizes with Nietzsche’s body of work.en_US
dc.description.abstractZimmerman, "Forcing Freedom: Applying Mill's Principles of Liberty in an International Society," 23-33. // The author extends Mill’s liberty theory to contemporary international politics, specifically in relation to liberal intervention theory. The author tries to interpret Mill in the spirit of some popular liberal theories, but argues for why such an interpretation, which draws an analogy between the role of an individual and the role of a state’s government, would not be supported by Mill himself. For Mill, the individual is the central moral force, which is not simply in an appeal to prevent against harm toward a particular entity (as with looking-out for one particular nation among many in the international community). Even factoring in Mill’s argument about the Mormon community does not keep Mill from having a relatively wide theory for the acceptability of foreign intervention.en_US
dc.description.abstractFeiman, "Possible Worlds and Counterfactuals: Critique and Commentary on Complicating Causation," 34-40. // This article focuses on David Lewis’s theory of causation. The author provides helpful clarity regarding the difference between material and counterfactual conditions, the distinction between causal dependence and causation, and the nature of possible world theories in general. Although it is found that Lewis does not fall victim to the problems of metaphysical impossibility or preemption, his theory still relies too much on mere intuition. Lewis’ solution is not very convincing when it comes to the slippery issue of causation.en_US
dc.description.abstractTrochimchuk, "The Natural Philosophies of Descartes and Newton: A Kuhnian Reflection," 41-59. // Kuhn can be used to describe shifts in science other than just the Copernican Revolution. This paper argues that Newton’s theory of mechanics, especially the notion of gravitational force, only appears to be responding to “deficiencies” in Descartes’ corpuscularism. In reality, Newton’s theory represents a paradigm shift. To make his case, the author first supplies useful summaries of Descartes’ and Newton’s sciences, as well as Kuhn’s meta-scientific project. The author then emphasizes that on issues like gravity and mass, the Cartesian and Newtonian systems of science hold each other’s theoretical concepts to be senseless when judged from within their own. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions provides an appropriate lens through which to understand this stage in the history of science.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900.en_US
dc.subjectKant, Immanuel, 1724-1804.en_US
dc.subjectAristotle.en_US
dc.subjectNineteenthen_US
dc.subjectEternal Recurrenceen_US
dc.subjectMoralityen_US
dc.subjectOvermanen_US
dc.subjectPsychologyen_US
dc.subjectImmortalityen_US
dc.subjectMill, John Stuart, 1806-1873.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectLibertyen_US
dc.subjectPoliticsen_US
dc.subjectLiberalismen_US
dc.subjectInternationalen_US
dc.subjectInterventionen_US
dc.subjectStateen_US
dc.subjectLewis, Daviden_US
dc.subjectMetaphysics.en_US
dc.subjectCausationen_US
dc.subjectPreemptionen_US
dc.subjectIntuitionen_US
dc.subjectCounterfactualen_US
dc.subjectKuhn, Thomas S.en_US
dc.subjectDescartes, René, 1596-1650.en_US
dc.subjectNewton, Isaac, Sir, 1642-1727.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.subjectParadigmen_US
dc.subjectIncommensurabilityen_US
dc.subjectProgressen_US
dc.subjectHistoryen_US
dc.subjectMechanicsen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XIXen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHenricks, Meganen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJones, Kellyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRosenberg, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBarber, Christopheren_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCasey, Brianen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCox, Jasonen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDailey, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHavens, Kimbreyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardKalinowski, Sarahen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardKeaveney, Meganen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardStevens, Susanen_US
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
Creative Commons
All Items in The Five Colleges of Ohio Digital Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.