Title:
Episteme Vol. XVIII
Authors:
Daigle, Jennifer Lynn; Victor, Ryan; Mossburger, David; Westra, Adam
Abstract:
Daigle, "On the Validity of Spinoza's Proof for Monism: A Question of Equivocation," 6-17. // Spinoza’s metaphysics fails to employ a consistent use of terms, such as “finite” and “infinite”. After clarifying Spinoza’s philosophical project and analyzing his proof for ontological monism, the author provides a discussion of Spinoza’s employ of concepts “finite” and “infinite,” given his distinction between attribute and absolute. It is found that Spinoza improperly jumps to the existence of God, but that he might be more successful in proving the existence of absolute Being.

Victor, "The Extended Room or What Otto Didn't Know," 18-30. // The author provides succinct explications of the relevant literature pertaining to the debate resulting from Turing’s thesis on artificial intelligence. It is argued that Searle’s Chinese room example is refuted by neither the so-called systems reply nor the Extended Mind thesis. Such attempts to defend strong AI err because they rely on altered definitions of concepts that we should not accept. The author, in addition to pointing out the importance of factoring in consciousness, provides several illustrative examples, parallels, and original arguments (including a modified concept of “strong coupling”) in his defense of Searle’s position. The paper concludes with a new thesis concerning the equivocation of mind as capacity and mind as totality, as well a postscript on the nature of meaning.

Mossburger, "Hume: Causality and Subjectivity," 31-44. // In the Enquiry, Hume’s discussion of causality figures heavily in his critique of the rationalists. But what exactly do his two “definitions” of causality mean? The author addresses competing questions that arise from Hume’s ambiguity, but one thing is paramount here: both definitions imply a subject’s experience of causality. Following this, the author ponders the uniqueness of cumulative experience and personal belief, later connecting these to Simon Blackburn’s account of the organization of ideas that lead us to think in causal terms. In conclusion, since Hume’s empiricism is metaphysically subjective, Blackburn’s anti-realist interpretation is to be preferred over either positivist or skeptical realist understandings of Hume.

Westra, "Metaphors of Objectivity," 45-61. // This paper analyzes how Bacon and Popper both use metaphors in support of their respective theories of the objectivity of progressive science. The author tracks each thinker’s prevalent use and dependence on metaphors; including Bacon’s appeal to religion and the emerging science of optics, and Popper’s biological analogy and dismissal of Kuhn’s relativistic view of science and knowledge. The author argues that the objectivist theorists are plagued by the fact that metaphors are not objective. It seems we must accept only one of the two: their objectivity claims or their methodological approach of using metaphors. The author prefers the latter but this does not save objectivist theories.
Advisors:
Bradner, Alexandra
Editors:
Fortin, Will
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/757; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorBradner, Alexandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorDaigle, Jennifer Lynnen_US
dc.contributor.authorVictor, Ryanen_US
dc.contributor.authorMossburger, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorWestra, Adamen_US
dc.contributor.editorFortin, Willen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:13Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:41:14Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:13Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:41:14Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/757en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractDaigle, "On the Validity of Spinoza's Proof for Monism: A Question of Equivocation," 6-17. // Spinoza’s metaphysics fails to employ a consistent use of terms, such as “finite” and “infinite”. After clarifying Spinoza’s philosophical project and analyzing his proof for ontological monism, the author provides a discussion of Spinoza’s employ of concepts “finite” and “infinite,” given his distinction between attribute and absolute. It is found that Spinoza improperly jumps to the existence of God, but that he might be more successful in proving the existence of absolute Being.en_US
dc.description.abstractVictor, "The Extended Room or What Otto Didn't Know," 18-30. // The author provides succinct explications of the relevant literature pertaining to the debate resulting from Turing’s thesis on artificial intelligence. It is argued that Searle’s Chinese room example is refuted by neither the so-called systems reply nor the Extended Mind thesis. Such attempts to defend strong AI err because they rely on altered definitions of concepts that we should not accept. The author, in addition to pointing out the importance of factoring in consciousness, provides several illustrative examples, parallels, and original arguments (including a modified concept of “strong coupling”) in his defense of Searle’s position. The paper concludes with a new thesis concerning the equivocation of mind as capacity and mind as totality, as well a postscript on the nature of meaning.en_US
dc.description.abstractMossburger, "Hume: Causality and Subjectivity," 31-44. // In the Enquiry, Hume’s discussion of causality figures heavily in his critique of the rationalists. But what exactly do his two “definitions” of causality mean? The author addresses competing questions that arise from Hume’s ambiguity, but one thing is paramount here: both definitions imply a subject’s experience of causality. Following this, the author ponders the uniqueness of cumulative experience and personal belief, later connecting these to Simon Blackburn’s account of the organization of ideas that lead us to think in causal terms. In conclusion, since Hume’s empiricism is metaphysically subjective, Blackburn’s anti-realist interpretation is to be preferred over either positivist or skeptical realist understandings of Hume.en_US
dc.description.abstractWestra, "Metaphors of Objectivity," 45-61. // This paper analyzes how Bacon and Popper both use metaphors in support of their respective theories of the objectivity of progressive science. The author tracks each thinker’s prevalent use and dependence on metaphors; including Bacon’s appeal to religion and the emerging science of optics, and Popper’s biological analogy and dismissal of Kuhn’s relativistic view of science and knowledge. The author argues that the objectivist theorists are plagued by the fact that metaphors are not objective. It seems we must accept only one of the two: their objectivity claims or their methodological approach of using metaphors. The author prefers the latter but this does not save objectivist theories.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectSpinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677.en_US
dc.subjectModernen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysics.en_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectMonismen_US
dc.subjectFiniteen_US
dc.subjectGoden_US
dc.subjectSubstanceen_US
dc.subjectSearle, John R.en_US
dc.subjectTuring, Alan Mathison, 1912-1954en_US
dc.subjectClark, Andyen_US
dc.subjectChalmers, David John 1966-en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind.en_US
dc.subjectArtificial Intelligenceen_US
dc.subjectComputeren_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectUnderstandingen_US
dc.subjectTuring Testen_US
dc.subjectHume, David, 1711-1776.en_US
dc.subjectBlackburn, Simonen_US
dc.subjectCausalityen_US
dc.subjectEmpiricismen_US
dc.subjectAnti-Realismen_US
dc.subjectSkepticismen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectExperienceen_US
dc.subjectBacon, Francis, 1561-1626.en_US
dc.subjectPopper, Karl R. (Karl Raimund), 1902-1994.en_US
dc.subjectKuhn, Thomas S.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.subjectEpistemology.en_US
dc.subjectObjectivityen_US
dc.subjectMetaphoren_US
dc.subjectHistoryen_US
dc.subjectProgressen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XVIIIen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardNeiheisel, Jacoben_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHenricks, Meganen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRozman, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBenham, Samen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTawse, Annaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJohnson, Timothy Scotten_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBarber, Chrisen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardKirwan, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRosenberg, Alexen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDailey, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardNorskog, Amyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardKalinowski, Sarahen_US
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