Title:
Episteme Vol. XVII
Authors:
Alberts, Joseph; Warner, Gregory R.; Brawley, Anna Brenton; Hannon, Michael
Abstract:
Alberts, "Bratman on Intending," 21-34. // This article is a response to Michael E. Bratman’s novel thought experiments in “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention” and so concerns instrumental rational planning agency. The basic question is: When should an agent alter her intentions? Bratman criticizes two planning strategies, Sophistication and Resolution, which rely on too narrow planning logics: the linking principle and/or the standard view. As an alternative, Bratman introduces the No-Regret principle to meet the demands of rational planning in his more complicated examples. The author notes a problem, though: Bratman is operating under a misleading understanding of intention that violates the condition of belief consistency. Once we borrow the concept of indefeasibility from epistemology, and also introduce the notion of defeaters, we can formulate a new test for intention which deems Bratman’s argument in his Toxin case a failure.

Warner, "Hilary Putnam's Semantic Scientism: A Critique," 35-46. // This author is puzzled by and disagrees with Putnam’s theory of meaning. In particular, the author argues that there can be a gap between scientific meaning and acceptable normal use, thereby showing the tension between Putnam’s scientism and his attention to linguistic communities. Part of the problem is Putnam’s imprecision, given that he neither argues for why we should privilege scientific classification, nor helps us draw the boundary surrounding our linguistic community. The author cites commentator Gregory McCulloch a great deal to help summarize and grasp Putnam’s project, thereby necessitating a discussion of McCulloch’s own “the understanding tracks real essence” doctrine as well as analyses of Putnam’s Twin Earth, beech/elm, “bonnet” and “robin” scenarios. Even if we are attracted to Putnam’s theses that 1) resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for representation, and 2) syntactic and phonetic similarity is not sufficient for co-extension, Putnam’s theory does not add up.

Brawley, "A Logical Absurdity: Jeremy Bentham and the Auto-Icon," 47-61. // Ever wonder what might be the most absurd idea to come out of the Age of Reason? This paper in the history of philosophy supplies one possibility: Jeremy Bentham’s Auto-Icon. This study places Bentham’s decision to preserve his physical body in the context of his full body of philosophical and social work, itself contextualized within the revolutionary ideas and advances of the Enlightenment. The author touches on Bentham’s philosophy, his fondness for invention and science, as well as his vehement religious and political critiques. It is argued that the Auto-Icon embodies Bentham’s desire to promote universal happiness and to set a moral precedent. The Auto-Icon is actually a logical conclusion given Bentham’s views, no matter its absurd character.

Hannon, "An Analysis of Freedom and Rational Egoism in Notes From Underground," 62-72. // In trying to decide between Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s expressivism, the author confronts a huge overarching question: What does it mean to be human? The discussion looks at Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who believes that a rational utopia leaves humans without their most prized advantage: free will. The author determines that Dostoevsky’s notion of freedom is designed to negate Chernyshevsky’s, but to what extent must the Underground Man exist in a society organized so rationally? If the Underground Man need not be a product of society, then what can be the value of the unpleasant experience the Underground Man seems to offer as the alternative to rational egoism? Ultimately, since the two philosophers offer incompatible conceptions of freedom, we cannot definitely decide which to prefer. But, the author asserts, Dostoevsky still fails to justify satisfactorily his conception of human nature.
Advisors:
Bradner, Alexandra
Editors:
Stotts, Jason
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/756; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorBradner, Alexandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorAlberts, Josephen_US
dc.contributor.authorWarner, Gregory R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBrawley, Anna Brentonen_US
dc.contributor.authorHannon, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.editorStotts, Jasonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:12Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:41:08Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:12Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:41:08Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/756en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractAlberts, "Bratman on Intending," 21-34. // This article is a response to Michael E. Bratman’s novel thought experiments in “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention” and so concerns instrumental rational planning agency. The basic question is: When should an agent alter her intentions? Bratman criticizes two planning strategies, Sophistication and Resolution, which rely on too narrow planning logics: the linking principle and/or the standard view. As an alternative, Bratman introduces the No-Regret principle to meet the demands of rational planning in his more complicated examples. The author notes a problem, though: Bratman is operating under a misleading understanding of intention that violates the condition of belief consistency. Once we borrow the concept of indefeasibility from epistemology, and also introduce the notion of defeaters, we can formulate a new test for intention which deems Bratman’s argument in his Toxin case a failure.en_US
dc.description.abstractWarner, "Hilary Putnam's Semantic Scientism: A Critique," 35-46. // This author is puzzled by and disagrees with Putnam’s theory of meaning. In particular, the author argues that there can be a gap between scientific meaning and acceptable normal use, thereby showing the tension between Putnam’s scientism and his attention to linguistic communities. Part of the problem is Putnam’s imprecision, given that he neither argues for why we should privilege scientific classification, nor helps us draw the boundary surrounding our linguistic community. The author cites commentator Gregory McCulloch a great deal to help summarize and grasp Putnam’s project, thereby necessitating a discussion of McCulloch’s own “the understanding tracks real essence” doctrine as well as analyses of Putnam’s Twin Earth, beech/elm, “bonnet” and “robin” scenarios. Even if we are attracted to Putnam’s theses that 1) resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for representation, and 2) syntactic and phonetic similarity is not sufficient for co-extension, Putnam’s theory does not add up.en_US
dc.description.abstractBrawley, "A Logical Absurdity: Jeremy Bentham and the Auto-Icon," 47-61. // Ever wonder what might be the most absurd idea to come out of the Age of Reason? This paper in the history of philosophy supplies one possibility: Jeremy Bentham’s Auto-Icon. This study places Bentham’s decision to preserve his physical body in the context of his full body of philosophical and social work, itself contextualized within the revolutionary ideas and advances of the Enlightenment. The author touches on Bentham’s philosophy, his fondness for invention and science, as well as his vehement religious and political critiques. It is argued that the Auto-Icon embodies Bentham’s desire to promote universal happiness and to set a moral precedent. The Auto-Icon is actually a logical conclusion given Bentham’s views, no matter its absurd character.en_US
dc.description.abstractHannon, "An Analysis of Freedom and Rational Egoism in Notes From Underground," 62-72. // In trying to decide between Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s expressivism, the author confronts a huge overarching question: What does it mean to be human? The discussion looks at Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who believes that a rational utopia leaves humans without their most prized advantage: free will. The author determines that Dostoevsky’s notion of freedom is designed to negate Chernyshevsky’s, but to what extent must the Underground Man exist in a society organized so rationally? If the Underground Man need not be a product of society, then what can be the value of the unpleasant experience the Underground Man seems to offer as the alternative to rational egoism? Ultimately, since the two philosophers offer incompatible conceptions of freedom, we cannot definitely decide which to prefer. But, the author asserts, Dostoevsky still fails to justify satisfactorily his conception of human nature.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectBratman, Michael E.en_US
dc.subjectHarmon, Gilberten_US
dc.subjectMoses, Louis J.en_US
dc.subjectAnalyticen_US
dc.subjectEpistemology.en_US
dc.subjectPlanningen_US
dc.subjectAgencyen_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.subjectIntentionen_US
dc.subjectIndefeasibilityen_US
dc.subjectPutnam, Hilaryen_US
dc.subjectMcCulloch, Gregoryen_US
dc.subjectLocke, John, 1632-1704.en_US
dc.subjectWittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Languageen_US
dc.subjectMeaningen_US
dc.subjectRealismen_US
dc.subjectExternalismen_US
dc.subjectNatural Kinden_US
dc.subjectEssenceen_US
dc.subjectBentham, Jeremy, 1748-1832.en_US
dc.subjectHistory of Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectUtilitarianismen_US
dc.subjectEnlightenmenten_US
dc.subjectAbsurdityen_US
dc.subjectBiographyen_US
dc.subjectDostoyevsky, Fyodor, 1821-1881en_US
dc.subjectChernyshevsky, Nikolay Gavrilovich, 1828-1889en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophical anthropology.en_US
dc.subjectFreedomen_US
dc.subjectHuman Natureen_US
dc.subjectFree Willen_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.subjectSocietyen_US
dc.subjectEgoismen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XVIIen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardFortin, Willen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardNeiheisel, Jacoben_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardStetz, Miriamen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardMcCann, Tayloren_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBenham, Samen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardMorrell, Matten_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRozman, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBarber, Chrisen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCaryer, Laurenen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJones, Kellyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTawse, Annaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHenricks, Meganen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJohnson, Timothy Scotten_US
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