Title:
Episteme Vol. XIV
Authors:
Lee, John; Chenault, David Allen; Winham, Ilya P.; Trice, Brittany G.; Lockhart, Mike
Abstract:
Lee, "A Defense of Scientific Phenomenalism from the Perspective of Contemporary Physics," 6-18. // Contrary to believing in scientific realism, the author provides a defense of scientific phenomenalism, which holds that only things that we can perceive can be counted as things that exist. The author agrees with W. T. Stace, who holds that science does not explain but merely describes and predicts. Such an understanding suggests that scientists go beyond their bounds when they support the existence of certain theoretical (non-observable) entities—things like quarks and warped spacetime. When such “things” are just mathematical constructs, it becomes easier to comprehend the nature of light, the Higgs mechanism, the electro and magnetic fields, and even the bold, albeit confusing, supersymmetry theory. Likely as beneficial to capital S science as Popper’s falsificationism, scientific phenomenalism, when compared to realism, is more concise, less confusing, and better at describing the continued usefulness of rejected theories.

Chenault, "Desertification and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Abbey," 19-30. // The truth is neither simply culture derived from nature, nor nature from culture. Can we (qua humans) merge with nature and still maintain our self-intelligibility? –This is the question that the anti-anti-naturalist concentrates on. The author looks at Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, which posits a new metaphysics that requires us to enter the violent, heartless desert that is the paradoxical dual immanence of nature. The paper looks at the desert in the Genealogy’s discussion of the ascetic ideal, and how it relates to Edward Abbey’s isolation and book Desert Solitaire. Importantly, the similarities in-part stem from their similar post-modern sensibility. In the end, it turns out that the desert is a purifying place—that humanity’s meaning comes from a turning away from that is at the same time a turning towards.

Winham, "What is 'Natural' About Natural Science: Philosophical Naturalism in the Evolution Debate," 31-44. // Creationist Phillip E. Johnson argues that evolution theory is a product of a bias toward naturalistic explanation—a materialist philosophical ideology that encroaches on empirical science. This position even got some support from philosopher Michael Ruse. But the fact is science must include a base level of presupposition; the creationist, while supplying her own, mistakenly thinks that science can operate without such an explanatory guide. This paper defends naturalism in science, thereby rejecting the concerns and arguments of neo-creationists. In this effort, the author argues why naturalism is important to science, uses Dewey to explain why anti-naturalism leads to careless science, and turns to Hume to expose some logical mistakes in the creationist position.

Trice, "Religious Experience, Pluralistic Knowledge and William James," 45-61. // This article explores the qualities and nature of the “religious” or mystical experience according to James and pragmatic philosophy in general. The author initially provides an overview of James’ philosophy of religion, which includes his pragmatic commitments, understanding of experience, and emphasis on cognitive relations. Then there arises a question: How can I know that others have mystical experience, too? James’s push to make the mystical experience scientific misjudges the utility of his quasi-chaos idea, which can be shown to support inter-subjective knowledge and position religion within what the author deems “pluralistic knowledge.” In the end, Rorty and Bruce Wilshire are employed in order to demonstrate the high importance and greatness of such pluralistic knowledge, particularly with regard to the supersensible.

Lockhart, "Behavior and Other Minds: A Response to Functionalists," 62-72. // Functionalism’s metaphysics is wrongly thought to answer the epistemological question of the existence of the other’s mentality. Contra Elliot Reed, the practical utility of being able to solve the problem of other minds does not make functionalism the best theory of mind, nor does it actually solve the problem of other minds. Reed’s circular argument implicitly relies on abstract behaviorism and the need to solve the problem of other minds. What must come first, however, is a correct ontology of the mind. Functionalism struggles with intentionality, disregards qualia, and, according to Searle’s excellent thought experiments, is incompatible with what we believe about consciousness. Functionalism is not king. Rest assured, turning away from a behavior-based solution to the problem of other minds need not push us into skepticism; until a robust neuroscience arrives, we should be content with common sense.
Advisors:
Moller, Mark
Editors:
Shonk, Charles
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/753; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorMoller, Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorLee, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorChenault, David Allenen_US
dc.contributor.authorWinham, Ilya P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTrice, Brittany G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLockhart, Mikeen_US
dc.contributor.editorShonk, Charlesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:09Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:40:53Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:09Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:40:53Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/753en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractLee, "A Defense of Scientific Phenomenalism from the Perspective of Contemporary Physics," 6-18. // Contrary to believing in scientific realism, the author provides a defense of scientific phenomenalism, which holds that only things that we can perceive can be counted as things that exist. The author agrees with W. T. Stace, who holds that science does not explain but merely describes and predicts. Such an understanding suggests that scientists go beyond their bounds when they support the existence of certain theoretical (non-observable) entities—things like quarks and warped spacetime. When such “things” are just mathematical constructs, it becomes easier to comprehend the nature of light, the Higgs mechanism, the electro and magnetic fields, and even the bold, albeit confusing, supersymmetry theory. Likely as beneficial to capital S science as Popper’s falsificationism, scientific phenomenalism, when compared to realism, is more concise, less confusing, and better at describing the continued usefulness of rejected theories.en_US
dc.description.abstractChenault, "Desertification and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Abbey," 19-30. // The truth is neither simply culture derived from nature, nor nature from culture. Can we (qua humans) merge with nature and still maintain our self-intelligibility? –This is the question that the anti-anti-naturalist concentrates on. The author looks at Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, which posits a new metaphysics that requires us to enter the violent, heartless desert that is the paradoxical dual immanence of nature. The paper looks at the desert in the Genealogy’s discussion of the ascetic ideal, and how it relates to Edward Abbey’s isolation and book Desert Solitaire. Importantly, the similarities in-part stem from their similar post-modern sensibility. In the end, it turns out that the desert is a purifying place—that humanity’s meaning comes from a turning away from that is at the same time a turning towards.en_US
dc.description.abstractWinham, "What is 'Natural' About Natural Science: Philosophical Naturalism in the Evolution Debate," 31-44. // Creationist Phillip E. Johnson argues that evolution theory is a product of a bias toward naturalistic explanation—a materialist philosophical ideology that encroaches on empirical science. This position even got some support from philosopher Michael Ruse. But the fact is science must include a base level of presupposition; the creationist, while supplying her own, mistakenly thinks that science can operate without such an explanatory guide. This paper defends naturalism in science, thereby rejecting the concerns and arguments of neo-creationists. In this effort, the author argues why naturalism is important to science, uses Dewey to explain why anti-naturalism leads to careless science, and turns to Hume to expose some logical mistakes in the creationist position.en_US
dc.description.abstractTrice, "Religious Experience, Pluralistic Knowledge and William James," 45-61. // This article explores the qualities and nature of the “religious” or mystical experience according to James and pragmatic philosophy in general. The author initially provides an overview of James’ philosophy of religion, which includes his pragmatic commitments, understanding of experience, and emphasis on cognitive relations. Then there arises a question: How can I know that others have mystical experience, too? James’s push to make the mystical experience scientific misjudges the utility of his quasi-chaos idea, which can be shown to support inter-subjective knowledge and position religion within what the author deems “pluralistic knowledge.” In the end, Rorty and Bruce Wilshire are employed in order to demonstrate the high importance and greatness of such pluralistic knowledge, particularly with regard to the supersensible.en_US
dc.description.abstractLockhart, "Behavior and Other Minds: A Response to Functionalists," 62-72. // Functionalism’s metaphysics is wrongly thought to answer the epistemological question of the existence of the other’s mentality. Contra Elliot Reed, the practical utility of being able to solve the problem of other minds does not make functionalism the best theory of mind, nor does it actually solve the problem of other minds. Reed’s circular argument implicitly relies on abstract behaviorism and the need to solve the problem of other minds. What must come first, however, is a correct ontology of the mind. Functionalism struggles with intentionality, disregards qualia, and, according to Searle’s excellent thought experiments, is incompatible with what we believe about consciousness. Functionalism is not king. Rest assured, turning away from a behavior-based solution to the problem of other minds need not push us into skepticism; until a robust neuroscience arrives, we should be content with common sense.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectStace, W. T. (Walter Terence), 1886-en_US
dc.subjectChalmers, Alanen_US
dc.subjectPhenomenology.en_US
dc.subjectScientific Phenomenalismen_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectPhysicsen_US
dc.subjectRealismen_US
dc.subjectAnti-Realismen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900.en_US
dc.subjectAbbey, Edward, 1927-1989en_US
dc.subjectDerrida, Jacques.en_US
dc.subjectMetaphysics.en_US
dc.subjectExistentialism.en_US
dc.subjectPost-Modernen_US
dc.subjectNaturalismen_US
dc.subjectCultureen_US
dc.subjectParadoxen_US
dc.subjectAscetic Idealen_US
dc.subjectStyleen_US
dc.subjectRuse, Michaelen_US
dc.subjectDewey, John, 1859-1952.en_US
dc.subjectHume, David, 1711-1776.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionen_US
dc.subjectDarwinismen_US
dc.subjectCreationismen_US
dc.subjectEmpiricismen_US
dc.subjectJames, William, 1842-1910.en_US
dc.subjectRorty, Richard.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Religionen_US
dc.subjectMystical Experienceen_US
dc.subjectPluralismen_US
dc.subjectSupersensibleen_US
dc.subjectQuasi-Chaosen_US
dc.subjectReed, Ellioten_US
dc.subjectSearle, John R.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind.en_US
dc.subjectFunctionalismen_US
dc.subjectOther Mindsen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectQualiaen_US
dc.subjectIntentionalityen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XIVen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHupp, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTipping, Matthewen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBluestein, Brookeen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCarty, Tamaraen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardConnor, Kevinen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJones, Justinen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardLauricella, Noahen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardWyllie, Roberten_US
dc.equipment.digitizingMinolta PS7000en_US
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
Creative Commons
All Items in The Five Colleges of Ohio Digital Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.