Title:
Episteme Vol. XIII
Authors:
Thuline, Theresa; Hartzell, Lauren; Reed, Elliot; Hemm, Robert, Jr; Miller, Joseph Curtis
Abstract:
Thuline, "The Hyperphilosophy of Extraordinary Communication," 6-16. // By rejecting orthodoxy, systemization, and objectivity, metaphor allows us to express the extraordinary, contradictory, and paradoxical. Kierkegaard’s Postscript provides a good entry into the concept of metaphor, because it demonstrates the dialectical concepts that give rise to the usefulness of figurative language tools like metaphor and its sidekick, irony. Ricœur extends and elaborates on Kierkegaard’s dialectical philosophy. Together, contrary to Marie I. George’s thoughts on the suitability of metaphors in philosophy, these thinkers speak of the necessarily indirect linguistic means to communicate divine passion and to avoid the pitfalls of standard social meaning-expression. The author concludes by appreciating Pastor Robert White’s essay on using metaphor in preaching.

Hartzell, "Anaphoric Deflationism: Truth and Reference," 17-26. // As a reaction to Dorothy Grover and Robert Brandom, this paper examines semantic concerns about intralinguistic relationships and functions. The author supports Brandom’s interpretation of Grover and argues that the prosentential theory of truth must accept the pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain an anaphoric account of truth. The author uses Brandom’s logic to brand Grover an anaphoric deflationist—whether she intended to be one or not. But Brandom’s appeal to reference only begins the project of extending Grover. What other anaphoric mechanisms still need to be identified, the author asks? How do we account for notions of substantive truth and reference? The author answers this second question: the phrase “is true” in prosentences can be basically replaced by “is the truth”; likewise, “refers” can be replaced by “reference” without abandoning the anaphoric function of the complex pronoun. Still, though, it is worrisome that anaphoric deflationism presupposes the exclusion of substantive truth and reference.

Reed, "Functionalism, Qualia, and Other Minds," 27-37. // We can solve the problem of other minds by reference to behavior only if we conceive of consciousness in functional terms. Folk psychology, though incomplete, supplies us with mental categories that are useful for prediction and explanation and thus can become functional categories. We need psychology and linguistics to work together to create a substantial body of research. The author spends a great deal of time responding to an objecting interlocutor, out of which comes supplemental details such as a discussion of functional equivalence; a response to the reductio ad absurdum complaint against the liberal intentional stance; an argument about quaila that does not suggest the nonexistence of qualia, but rather argues that people who want to place a special value on qualia, cannot, in turn, solve the problem of other minds; a critique of Searle’s critique; and a reply to a Putnam-inspired appraisal of functionalism’s ability to handle propositional equivalence.

Hemm, Jr, "Causality, Emergentism, and Mentality," 38-45. // The author here combines the insights of John Dupré and Jaeqwon Kim to supply a new answer to the big conundrum in the philosophy of mind: the mind/body problem. He begins with an overview of Dupré’s take on the classic modern take of causality and determinism, concluding that if Dupré is right and probabilistic catastrophism is true, this theory of probability has important consequences for the mind/body problem. Specifically, probabilistic catastrophism can address the question forced by Kim’s emergentism: how do irreducible mental properties interact with the closed causal nexus of the physical world? The paper concludes by considering what this new thesis means for the question over whether mentality can be multiply realized—if other things could behave like brains.

Miller, "Warrant, Proper Function, and the Great Pumpkin Objection," 46-56. // Because it eschews classical foundationalism and coherence theory, one must wonder about the reliability of Plantinga’s radical account of knowledge of God’s existence. How does his appeal to proper basicality and epistemic warrant fair against Keith Lehrer’s objections? The answer: not very well. The author gives an analysis of Plantinga’s proper functionality concept, his grounds for warranted belief, and his anticipated response to what he calls the Great Pumpkin Objection. Next, the author presents Lehrer’s two counterexamples, Mr. Truetemp and Ms. Prejudice, and supports Lehrer’s claims that they show that proper functionality is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for knowledge. Plantinga cannot save himself by drawing a dubious distinction between cognitive process and cognitive faculty, can he? No. Plantinga goes awry somewhere, and perhaps he should think some more about the Great Pumpkin.
Advisors:
Moller, Mark
Editors:
Dunson, Jim
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/752; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorMoller, Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorThuline, Theresaen_US
dc.contributor.authorHartzell, Laurenen_US
dc.contributor.authorReed, Ellioten_US
dc.contributor.authorHemm, Robert, Jren_US
dc.contributor.authorMiller, Joseph Curtisen_US
dc.contributor.editorDunson, Jimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:08Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:40:47Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:08Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:40:47Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/752en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractThuline, "The Hyperphilosophy of Extraordinary Communication," 6-16. // By rejecting orthodoxy, systemization, and objectivity, metaphor allows us to express the extraordinary, contradictory, and paradoxical. Kierkegaard’s Postscript provides a good entry into the concept of metaphor, because it demonstrates the dialectical concepts that give rise to the usefulness of figurative language tools like metaphor and its sidekick, irony. Ricœur extends and elaborates on Kierkegaard’s dialectical philosophy. Together, contrary to Marie I. George’s thoughts on the suitability of metaphors in philosophy, these thinkers speak of the necessarily indirect linguistic means to communicate divine passion and to avoid the pitfalls of standard social meaning-expression. The author concludes by appreciating Pastor Robert White’s essay on using metaphor in preaching.en_US
dc.description.abstractHartzell, "Anaphoric Deflationism: Truth and Reference," 17-26. // As a reaction to Dorothy Grover and Robert Brandom, this paper examines semantic concerns about intralinguistic relationships and functions. The author supports Brandom’s interpretation of Grover and argues that the prosentential theory of truth must accept the pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain an anaphoric account of truth. The author uses Brandom’s logic to brand Grover an anaphoric deflationist—whether she intended to be one or not. But Brandom’s appeal to reference only begins the project of extending Grover. What other anaphoric mechanisms still need to be identified, the author asks? How do we account for notions of substantive truth and reference? The author answers this second question: the phrase “is true” in prosentences can be basically replaced by “is the truth”; likewise, “refers” can be replaced by “reference” without abandoning the anaphoric function of the complex pronoun. Still, though, it is worrisome that anaphoric deflationism presupposes the exclusion of substantive truth and reference.en_US
dc.description.abstractReed, "Functionalism, Qualia, and Other Minds," 27-37. // We can solve the problem of other minds by reference to behavior only if we conceive of consciousness in functional terms. Folk psychology, though incomplete, supplies us with mental categories that are useful for prediction and explanation and thus can become functional categories. We need psychology and linguistics to work together to create a substantial body of research. The author spends a great deal of time responding to an objecting interlocutor, out of which comes supplemental details such as a discussion of functional equivalence; a response to the reductio ad absurdum complaint against the liberal intentional stance; an argument about quaila that does not suggest the nonexistence of qualia, but rather argues that people who want to place a special value on qualia, cannot, in turn, solve the problem of other minds; a critique of Searle’s critique; and a reply to a Putnam-inspired appraisal of functionalism’s ability to handle propositional equivalence.en_US
dc.description.abstractHemm, Jr, "Causality, Emergentism, and Mentality," 38-45. // The author here combines the insights of John Dupré and Jaeqwon Kim to supply a new answer to the big conundrum in the philosophy of mind: the mind/body problem. He begins with an overview of Dupré’s take on the classic modern take of causality and determinism, concluding that if Dupré is right and probabilistic catastrophism is true, this theory of probability has important consequences for the mind/body problem. Specifically, probabilistic catastrophism can address the question forced by Kim’s emergentism: how do irreducible mental properties interact with the closed causal nexus of the physical world? The paper concludes by considering what this new thesis means for the question over whether mentality can be multiply realized—if other things could behave like brains.en_US
dc.description.abstractMiller, "Warrant, Proper Function, and the Great Pumpkin Objection," 46-56. // Because it eschews classical foundationalism and coherence theory, one must wonder about the reliability of Plantinga’s radical account of knowledge of God’s existence. How does his appeal to proper basicality and epistemic warrant fair against Keith Lehrer’s objections? The answer: not very well. The author gives an analysis of Plantinga’s proper functionality concept, his grounds for warranted belief, and his anticipated response to what he calls the Great Pumpkin Objection. Next, the author presents Lehrer’s two counterexamples, Mr. Truetemp and Ms. Prejudice, and supports Lehrer’s claims that they show that proper functionality is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for knowledge. Plantinga cannot save himself by drawing a dubious distinction between cognitive process and cognitive faculty, can he? No. Plantinga goes awry somewhere, and perhaps he should think some more about the Great Pumpkin.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectKierkegaard, Søren, 1813-1855.en_US
dc.subjectRicœur, Paul.en_US
dc.subjectGeorge, Marie I.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Religionen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Languageen_US
dc.subjectMetaphoren_US
dc.subjectParadoxen_US
dc.subjectSubjectivityen_US
dc.subjectDialecticen_US
dc.subjectBrandom, Robert.en_US
dc.subjectGrover, Dorothyen_US
dc.subjectSemanticsen_US
dc.subjectTruthen_US
dc.subjectProsentential Theoryen_US
dc.subjectPronominal Theoryen_US
dc.subjectDeflationismen_US
dc.subjectAnaphoren_US
dc.subjectDennett, Daniel Clement.en_US
dc.subjectSearle, John R.en_US
dc.subjectPutnam, Hilaryen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind.en_US
dc.subjectOther Mindsen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectFunctionalismen_US
dc.subjectPsychologyen_US
dc.subjectLinguisticsen_US
dc.subjectQualiaen_US
dc.subjectDupré, Johnen_US
dc.subjectKim, Jaegwonen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.subjectMind-Body Problemen_US
dc.subjectMentalityen_US
dc.subjectProbabilityen_US
dc.subjectCausalityen_US
dc.subjectPlantinga, Alvin.en_US
dc.subjectLehrer, Keithen_US
dc.subjectLogic.en_US
dc.subjectWarranten_US
dc.subjectGoden_US
dc.subjectBasicen_US
dc.subjectInductionen_US
dc.subjectTrue Beliefen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XIIIen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardShonk, Charlieen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBluestein, Brookeen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCoil, Meghanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCook, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHupp, Andyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJablonka, Jareden_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardJones, Justinen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardShuba, Jasonen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTipping, Matten_US
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