Title:
Episteme Vol. XI
Authors:
Tedesco, Peter J.; Tulkin, David; McMyler, Benjamin; Driscoll, Henry C.; Miller, Philip D.
Abstract:
Tedesco, "The Call of Duty and Beyond: Problems Concerning Justification and Virtue in the Ethical Models of Epistemology," 6-18. // Internalist considerations are crucial to a good theory of belief formation—epistemic or ethical. To get to this conclusion, the author first shows the insufficiency of a strong externalist account of true belief; he critique’s Plantinga’s reliabilism by way of demonstration. Plantinga’s idea of epistemic warrant shares a maximum ideal with utilitarianism (the desire for the most true beliefs), but the good intentions of the theory are undermined by 1) the author’s car counter-example that illustrates the relevance of internal circumstances, and 2) a realization that Plantinga pays no mind to volition variance. Next, the author analyzes Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s virtue ethics and notes its own form of reliabilism but promising internalist account of justification. Despite the fact that both theorists can be used improperly to reward vicious means to ends, such as guessing, Zagzebski’s virtue ethics improves the reliability of Plantinga’s epistemology.

Tulkin, "Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception," 19-34. // In recent years, Nussbaum/Putnam and M. F. Burnyeat have engaged in a back-and-forth debate over Aristotle’s theory of perception. This author traces the developments of this debate, explores the various questions that come into play, and ends up dissatisfied with both camps. There are two overriding questions: What does Aristotle mean to take as the nature of the sense-organ in perception? and How does esse naturale and esse intentionale link-up? The contemporary philosophers, perhaps sheltered by contemporary philosophy of mind, think they can prove their interpretation to be correct without answering this second question. The author reports the various replies, provides evidence from De Anima and De Moto, and considers how the Sorabji position and Aquinas’s Christian interpretation fit in. Ultimately, five conclusions result from the literature review, including one about the link between the physical and the mental. What is the conjunction between the object in nature and the perceived awareness?

McMyler, "Gadamer and the Authenticity of Openness," 35-46. // Gadamer is too often charged with subjectivism and relativism. Bearing in mind Hubert Dreyfus’ new interpretation that Heidegger describes two separate types of resoluteness and authenticity, the author rescues Gadamer’s philosophy of openness by identifying its hermeneutic with Heidegger’s Aristotelian side—skirting supposed associations with Kierkegaard or Nietzsche that have confused Gadamer’s project in the past. Following Heidegger, Gadamer’s epistemology identifies both a personal (situated, particular) horizon and historical (given, universal) horizon, and understanding is the fusion of the two. Gadamer’s openness is a condition of our accomplished understanding, where our knowing of our essential finitude promotes on-going attention to the concrete real. By way of analogy, Gadamer’s open person understands most readily, as Heidegger’s social virtuoso responds appropriately to the Situation. But it is important to stress that openness is not so much a trait as it is an ability in a situation-by-situation basis. Gadamer’s purpose is ethical insofar as he pushes for us to be more dialectical.

Driscoll, "Donagan and Heidegger: Two Conflicting Ideas of Authenticity," 47-57. // Alan Donagan criticizes Heidegger for falling into what Collingwood calls the “corrupt consciousness,” but this author explains that Donagan misunderstands Heidegger’s design. The paper opens with Donagan’s philosophy that ties ethics to rationality. Donagan’s fundamental principle of rationality requires each person to respect each other’s rationality, and Donagan’s Thomistic and Kantian theory of conscience determines the permissibility of actions. He believes that existentialism, including Heidegger’s, which does not agree to the principle of rationality, engenders a false consciousness, which thereby corrupts the conscience. But, the author contends, Heidegger’s phenomenology does not actually amount to this. Authenticity is not recognizing mortality and thereby neglecting ethics, but rather of being in the world; it is a phenomenological descriptive awareness, not evaluative. The author looks at Being in Time to show that Heidegger is not giving an ethics but only that which makes an ethics possible: primordial guilt and a summons to avoid falling prey to the “they-self”.

Miller, "Against the Necessity of Identity Statements," 58-68. // Kripke’s Naming and Necessity argues for an odd form of necessity with regard to identity statements. This paper demonstrates that such oddness is due to internal inconsistency and the falseness of Kripke’s notion of rigid designation. The author first examines Kripke’s philosophy of language which covers necessary vs. contingent, necessary vs. a priori, and the overturning of Kant with the claim that a necessary truth can be an a posteriori truth, like “Hesperus is Phosphorous.” Following Michael Wreen’s systematic understanding of Kripke’s argument, and agreeing with the logic of David Bostock’s and Helen Steward’s criticisms of Kripke, which challenge Kripke about possible worlds viz. the problematic notion of rigid designation, the author argues that the four elements of Kripke’s argument all demonstrate contingent truths, not necessary ones.
Advisors:
Vogel, Steven
Editors:
Lemke, Angelica; Miller, Philip D.
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/750; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorVogel, Stevenen_US
dc.contributor.authorTedesco, Peter J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTulkin, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorMcMyler, Benjaminen_US
dc.contributor.authorDriscoll, Henry C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMiller, Philip D.en_US
dc.contributor.editorLemke, Angelicaen_US
dc.contributor.editorMiller, Philip D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:05Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:40:29Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:05Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:40:29Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/750en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractTedesco, "The Call of Duty and Beyond: Problems Concerning Justification and Virtue in the Ethical Models of Epistemology," 6-18. // Internalist considerations are crucial to a good theory of belief formation—epistemic or ethical. To get to this conclusion, the author first shows the insufficiency of a strong externalist account of true belief; he critique’s Plantinga’s reliabilism by way of demonstration. Plantinga’s idea of epistemic warrant shares a maximum ideal with utilitarianism (the desire for the most true beliefs), but the good intentions of the theory are undermined by 1) the author’s car counter-example that illustrates the relevance of internal circumstances, and 2) a realization that Plantinga pays no mind to volition variance. Next, the author analyzes Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s virtue ethics and notes its own form of reliabilism but promising internalist account of justification. Despite the fact that both theorists can be used improperly to reward vicious means to ends, such as guessing, Zagzebski’s virtue ethics improves the reliability of Plantinga’s epistemology.en_US
dc.description.abstractTulkin, "Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception," 19-34. // In recent years, Nussbaum/Putnam and M. F. Burnyeat have engaged in a back-and-forth debate over Aristotle’s theory of perception. This author traces the developments of this debate, explores the various questions that come into play, and ends up dissatisfied with both camps. There are two overriding questions: What does Aristotle mean to take as the nature of the sense-organ in perception? and How does esse naturale and esse intentionale link-up? The contemporary philosophers, perhaps sheltered by contemporary philosophy of mind, think they can prove their interpretation to be correct without answering this second question. The author reports the various replies, provides evidence from De Anima and De Moto, and considers how the Sorabji position and Aquinas’s Christian interpretation fit in. Ultimately, five conclusions result from the literature review, including one about the link between the physical and the mental. What is the conjunction between the object in nature and the perceived awareness?en_US
dc.description.abstractMcMyler, "Gadamer and the Authenticity of Openness," 35-46. // Gadamer is too often charged with subjectivism and relativism. Bearing in mind Hubert Dreyfus’ new interpretation that Heidegger describes two separate types of resoluteness and authenticity, the author rescues Gadamer’s philosophy of openness by identifying its hermeneutic with Heidegger’s Aristotelian side—skirting supposed associations with Kierkegaard or Nietzsche that have confused Gadamer’s project in the past. Following Heidegger, Gadamer’s epistemology identifies both a personal (situated, particular) horizon and historical (given, universal) horizon, and understanding is the fusion of the two. Gadamer’s openness is a condition of our accomplished understanding, where our knowing of our essential finitude promotes on-going attention to the concrete real. By way of analogy, Gadamer’s open person understands most readily, as Heidegger’s social virtuoso responds appropriately to the Situation. But it is important to stress that openness is not so much a trait as it is an ability in a situation-by-situation basis. Gadamer’s purpose is ethical insofar as he pushes for us to be more dialectical.en_US
dc.description.abstractDriscoll, "Donagan and Heidegger: Two Conflicting Ideas of Authenticity," 47-57. // Alan Donagan criticizes Heidegger for falling into what Collingwood calls the “corrupt consciousness,” but this author explains that Donagan misunderstands Heidegger’s design. The paper opens with Donagan’s philosophy that ties ethics to rationality. Donagan’s fundamental principle of rationality requires each person to respect each other’s rationality, and Donagan’s Thomistic and Kantian theory of conscience determines the permissibility of actions. He believes that existentialism, including Heidegger’s, which does not agree to the principle of rationality, engenders a false consciousness, which thereby corrupts the conscience. But, the author contends, Heidegger’s phenomenology does not actually amount to this. Authenticity is not recognizing mortality and thereby neglecting ethics, but rather of being in the world; it is a phenomenological descriptive awareness, not evaluative. The author looks at Being in Time to show that Heidegger is not giving an ethics but only that which makes an ethics possible: primordial guilt and a summons to avoid falling prey to the “they-self”.en_US
dc.description.abstractMiller, "Against the Necessity of Identity Statements," 58-68. // Kripke’s Naming and Necessity argues for an odd form of necessity with regard to identity statements. This paper demonstrates that such oddness is due to internal inconsistency and the falseness of Kripke’s notion of rigid designation. The author first examines Kripke’s philosophy of language which covers necessary vs. contingent, necessary vs. a priori, and the overturning of Kant with the claim that a necessary truth can be an a posteriori truth, like “Hesperus is Phosphorous.” Following Michael Wreen’s systematic understanding of Kripke’s argument, and agreeing with the logic of David Bostock’s and Helen Steward’s criticisms of Kripke, which challenge Kripke about possible worlds viz. the problematic notion of rigid designation, the author argues that the four elements of Kripke’s argument all demonstrate contingent truths, not necessary ones.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectPlantinga, Alvin.en_US
dc.subjectZagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1946-en_US
dc.subjectAristotle.en_US
dc.subjectEpistemology.en_US
dc.subjectMetaethicsen_US
dc.subjectVirtueen_US
dc.subjectInternalismen_US
dc.subjectReliabilismen_US
dc.subjectExternalismen_US
dc.subjectWarranten_US
dc.subjectTrue Beliefen_US
dc.subjectNussbaum, Martha Craven, 1947-en_US
dc.subjectPutnam, Hilaryen_US
dc.subjectBurnyeat, M. F.en_US
dc.subjectHistory of Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectFunctionalismen_US
dc.subjectNatureen_US
dc.subjectRealismen_US
dc.subjectIntentionalityen_US
dc.subjectGadamer, Hans-Georg, 1900-2002.en_US
dc.subjectHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.en_US
dc.subjectDreyfus, Hubert L.en_US
dc.subjectEthics.en_US
dc.subjectAuthenticityen_US
dc.subjectOpennessen_US
dc.subjectHermeneuticsen_US
dc.subjectSituationen_US
dc.subjectDaseinen_US
dc.subjectDonagan, Alanen_US
dc.subjectExistentialism.en_US
dc.subjectPhenomenology.en_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.subjectConscienceen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectKripke, Saul A., 1940-en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Languageen_US
dc.subjectLogic.en_US
dc.subjectModal Logicen_US
dc.subjectRigid Designatoren_US
dc.subjectReferenceen_US
dc.subjectNamingen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. XIen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardClements, Ninaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCook, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDunson, Jimen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardHiller, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardKrishna, Viveken_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardShuba, Jasonen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTulkin, Daviden_US
dc.equipment.digitizingMinolta PS7000en_US
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