Title:
Episteme Vol. X
Authors:
Stewart, Andrew M.; Royal, Michael D.; Kijowski, James L.; Douglas, Christopher; Herrington, Benjamin K.
Abstract:
Stewart, "Aristotle's Theory of Genius Examined through Reid's Theory of Natural Signs," 5-13. // This paper explains how we might comprehend Aristotle’s paradoxical theory of metaphor via Thomas Reid’s theory of natural signs. A realist, Aristotle believes that metaphor, as a stretching of the structure of language, relies on a fundamental relationship between things in the world. Metaphors are better or worse depending on the selection of fitting terms, and good metaphors are said to be the sign of genius. Metaphor mastery cannot be taught, but rather is an “intuitive perception”. Since what cannot be learned cannot be predicated on concepts, Reid’s account of the second type of natural signs helps clarify how Aristotle’s “similarity in dissimilars” is discoverable. Furthermore, that such natural signs do not depend on experience but rather are known to all given the “constitution of human nature,” explains away the problem of how a non-genius would be able to comprehend a metaphor without being able to create one.

Royal, "Kant's Ostensible Anti-thesis of "Public" and "Private" and the Subversion of the Language of Authority in 'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"'," 14-26. // In “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” Kant provides a political argument built around his philosophical manipulation of the grammatical relationship between “public” and “private”. The author here elucidates the grammatical mechanism which, as John Christian Laursen argues, allows Kant to subvert concepts. A Wittgensteinian lens shows how Kant’s purportedly antonymic terms are drawn from different lines of opposition. He stealthily uses two meanings of the word “public.” Hamann’s influential critique, which establishes that Kant’s private use of reason amounts to a prescription of mere submission to authority, is deemed incorrect, if, in Kant’s address to the mind of an enlightened government, a) such a mind is enlightened, thereby capable to judge authorities, and b) such a government submits to the overarching judge: reason. Kant’s aim is to redirect revolutionary spirit toward a more sustainable positive change: a conceptual revolution in the politics of communication.

Kijowski, "A Critique of Ricœur's Call for Faith from the Atheism of Nietzsche: God is still Dead," 27-36. // Ricœur offers an interesting hermeneutical interpretation of Nietzsche’s “God is dead” concept, but this author believes Ricœur ultimately suggests the impossible. Following an interpretation of Nietzsche’s atheism, Ricœur’s hermeneutics of religion, atheism, and faith deem atheism a faith for a postreligious age. Using the Madman in The Gay Science and key ideas from the Genealogy, the author analyzes then critiques Ricœur’s belief that Nietzsche leaves room for non-ethical obedience via the phenomenon of la parole (word) that comes to us from the ultimate word of Being: God. The author, being more convinced by Kofman’s analysis of Nietzsche’s take on God, proposes a contrary hermeneutical analysis that posits “God” as a dead metaphor for ideal or absolute concepts. “God is dead” really means beyond good and evil, toward perspectivism.

Douglas, "Contra Mothersill Contra Kant: The Imperative Judgment of Taste in Beauty Restored and the Critique of Judgment," 37-50. // This article defends Kant’s aesthetics, drawn mainly from the Critique of Judgment. The author discusses the intricacies of Kant’s argument by exposing the errors in Mary Mothersill’s interpretations of Kant in her book Beauty Restored. One by one, the author supports his four theses. 1) Kant uses imperative language to surpass the counter intuitive deduction of aesthetic judgments, but those judgments are not any more or less normative compared to empirical judgments. 2) Kant does not demand for a principle to ground the judgment of taste: logic does. 3) Kant cannot be called conceptually biased because judgments of taste do not stem from concepts. 4) Kant is fully aware of the role that dialectic plays in the tentative, contingent nature of the aesthetic judgment: it is a prerequisite for arriving at valid judgments of taste.

Herrington, "Finding a New 'Meaning of Meaning'," 51-60. // The twofold thesis of this paper is that Putnam is incorrect to accept the existence of narrow content mental states, and that Tyler Burge, in exposing this error, can explain why mental content is not in the hands of the individual. The author studies Burge’s extension of Putnam’s views on mental content, comparing the arguments made in “The Meaning of Meaning” with Burge’s “Individualism and the Mental”. Burge argues that if extension differs on Twin Earth, then so must intension differ—something that Putnam overlooks. Burge’s analysis of the Twin Earth logic and his own counterfactual thought experiment concerning the term arthritis demonstrate that social content always infects mental content, thereby making it impossible for Putnam to say that water can have the same narrow meaning in his Twin Earth example. A corollary to this argument, of course, is Burge’s position that “water” is not an indexical natural kind term.
Advisors:
Fultner, Barbara
Editors:
Herrington, Benjamin K.; Kijowski, James L.; Miller, Philip D.
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/749; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorFultner, Barbaraen_US
dc.contributor.authorStewart, Andrew M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRoyal, Michael D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKijowski, James L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDouglas, Christopheren_US
dc.contributor.authorHerrington, Benjamin K.en_US
dc.contributor.editorHerrington, Benjamin K.en_US
dc.contributor.editorKijowski, James L.en_US
dc.contributor.editorMiller, Philip D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:50:04Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:40:22Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:50:04Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:40:22Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/749en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractStewart, "Aristotle's Theory of Genius Examined through Reid's Theory of Natural Signs," 5-13. // This paper explains how we might comprehend Aristotle’s paradoxical theory of metaphor via Thomas Reid’s theory of natural signs. A realist, Aristotle believes that metaphor, as a stretching of the structure of language, relies on a fundamental relationship between things in the world. Metaphors are better or worse depending on the selection of fitting terms, and good metaphors are said to be the sign of genius. Metaphor mastery cannot be taught, but rather is an “intuitive perception”. Since what cannot be learned cannot be predicated on concepts, Reid’s account of the second type of natural signs helps clarify how Aristotle’s “similarity in dissimilars” is discoverable. Furthermore, that such natural signs do not depend on experience but rather are known to all given the “constitution of human nature,” explains away the problem of how a non-genius would be able to comprehend a metaphor without being able to create one.en_US
dc.description.abstractRoyal, "Kant's Ostensible Anti-thesis of "Public" and "Private" and the Subversion of the Language of Authority in 'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"'," 14-26. // In “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” Kant provides a political argument built around his philosophical manipulation of the grammatical relationship between “public” and “private”. The author here elucidates the grammatical mechanism which, as John Christian Laursen argues, allows Kant to subvert concepts. A Wittgensteinian lens shows how Kant’s purportedly antonymic terms are drawn from different lines of opposition. He stealthily uses two meanings of the word “public.” Hamann’s influential critique, which establishes that Kant’s private use of reason amounts to a prescription of mere submission to authority, is deemed incorrect, if, in Kant’s address to the mind of an enlightened government, a) such a mind is enlightened, thereby capable to judge authorities, and b) such a government submits to the overarching judge: reason. Kant’s aim is to redirect revolutionary spirit toward a more sustainable positive change: a conceptual revolution in the politics of communication.en_US
dc.description.abstractKijowski, "A Critique of Ricœur's Call for Faith from the Atheism of Nietzsche: God is still Dead," 27-36. // Ricœur offers an interesting hermeneutical interpretation of Nietzsche’s “God is dead” concept, but this author believes Ricœur ultimately suggests the impossible. Following an interpretation of Nietzsche’s atheism, Ricœur’s hermeneutics of religion, atheism, and faith deem atheism a faith for a postreligious age. Using the Madman in The Gay Science and key ideas from the Genealogy, the author analyzes then critiques Ricœur’s belief that Nietzsche leaves room for non-ethical obedience via the phenomenon of la parole (word) that comes to us from the ultimate word of Being: God. The author, being more convinced by Kofman’s analysis of Nietzsche’s take on God, proposes a contrary hermeneutical analysis that posits “God” as a dead metaphor for ideal or absolute concepts. “God is dead” really means beyond good and evil, toward perspectivism.en_US
dc.description.abstractDouglas, "Contra Mothersill Contra Kant: The Imperative Judgment of Taste in Beauty Restored and the Critique of Judgment," 37-50. // This article defends Kant’s aesthetics, drawn mainly from the Critique of Judgment. The author discusses the intricacies of Kant’s argument by exposing the errors in Mary Mothersill’s interpretations of Kant in her book Beauty Restored. One by one, the author supports his four theses. 1) Kant uses imperative language to surpass the counter intuitive deduction of aesthetic judgments, but those judgments are not any more or less normative compared to empirical judgments. 2) Kant does not demand for a principle to ground the judgment of taste: logic does. 3) Kant cannot be called conceptually biased because judgments of taste do not stem from concepts. 4) Kant is fully aware of the role that dialectic plays in the tentative, contingent nature of the aesthetic judgment: it is a prerequisite for arriving at valid judgments of taste.en_US
dc.description.abstractHerrington, "Finding a New 'Meaning of Meaning'," 51-60. // The twofold thesis of this paper is that Putnam is incorrect to accept the existence of narrow content mental states, and that Tyler Burge, in exposing this error, can explain why mental content is not in the hands of the individual. The author studies Burge’s extension of Putnam’s views on mental content, comparing the arguments made in “The Meaning of Meaning” with Burge’s “Individualism and the Mental”. Burge argues that if extension differs on Twin Earth, then so must intension differ—something that Putnam overlooks. Burge’s analysis of the Twin Earth logic and his own counterfactual thought experiment concerning the term arthritis demonstrate that social content always infects mental content, thereby making it impossible for Putnam to say that water can have the same narrow meaning in his Twin Earth example. A corollary to this argument, of course, is Burge’s position that “water” is not an indexical natural kind term.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectAristotle.en_US
dc.subjectReid, Thomas, 1710-1796.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Languageen_US
dc.subjectMetaphoren_US
dc.subjectRhetoricen_US
dc.subjectNatural Signsen_US
dc.subjectGeniusen_US
dc.subjectSignificationen_US
dc.subjectKant, Immanuel, 1724-1804.en_US
dc.subjectWittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectModernen_US
dc.subjectEnlightenmenten_US
dc.subjectReasonen_US
dc.subjectFree Speechen_US
dc.subjectLanguage Gameen_US
dc.subjectAuthorityen_US
dc.subjectRicœur, Paul.en_US
dc.subjectNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900.en_US
dc.subjectHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.en_US
dc.subjectContinentalen_US
dc.subjectDiscourseen_US
dc.subjectHermeneuticsen_US
dc.subjectAtheismen_US
dc.subjectGoden_US
dc.subjectPerspectivismen_US
dc.subjectMothersill, Maryen_US
dc.subjectAesthetics.en_US
dc.subjectJudgmenten_US
dc.subjectTasteen_US
dc.subjectBeautyen_US
dc.subjectConcepten_US
dc.subjectDisinterestednessen_US
dc.subjectPutnam, Hilaryen_US
dc.subjectBurge, Tyleren_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind.en_US
dc.subjectAnalyticen_US
dc.subjectMeaningen_US
dc.subjectMentalen_US
dc.subjectIndexicalityen_US
dc.subjectExternalismen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. Xen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardLemke, Angelicaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBartley, Rebeccaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardClements, Ninaen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCook, Nathanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDunson, Jimen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardLeyrer, Sarahen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRowland, Leahen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTulkin, Daviden_US
dc.equipment.digitizingMinolta PS7000en_US
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