Title:
Episteme Vol. V
Authors:
Greeson, Michael P.; Janiak, Andrew; Perry, J. Ellis IV; Rector, Paul; Thomson, Kevin
Abstract:
Greeson, "Hobbes, Locke, and the State of Nature Theories: A Reassessment," 1-15. // The classic story told about modern political philosophy paints Hobbes and Locke as contrasting figures who have differing opinions about human psychology. The author of this article rejects such a picture and instead argues that Locke’s state of nature contains features that are strikingly similar to Hobbes’. The author reassesses the supposedly “egoist” Hobbes and the “civil” Locke. It becomes clear that Hobbes’ mechanism and rhetorical bent influence his description of the state of nature—the world without social arrangement. Locke, who is more direct and practical, depicts a state of nature that is actually pre-political and normative. Such differences mask the fact that each philosopher provides a compelling argument for the use of reason in politics—for the practical construction of political bodies. They both advocate a government designed to influence our natural passions and avoid the danger of war.

Janiak, "Arendt and MacIntyre on the Enlightenment's Failure," 17-34. // Arendt and MacIntyre, who come from two competing branches of contemporary philosophy, surprisingly both believe that the Enlightenment failed in large part due to the emptiness of the so-called “Rights of Man” and that this failure led the late-20th century to be a “post” era. But their critiques are distinct and beg comparison. The author endeavors to show that Arendt is better able to respond to MacIntyre than he to her, given the political—not philosophical—argument put forth by Arendt. The paper divides into four sections: the two overviews of each’s arguments concerning the Enlightenment, and each of their separate, imagined critiques/replies. Arendt, who supplements her social and political work with more philosophy in books like The Human Condition and On Revolution, can satisfy MacIntyre’s request for more broad philosophical influence. Arendt’s critique is deeper. MacIntyre claims to be a historicist, yet his documented response to Edel’s critique of his approach to history shows us that MacIntyre mistakenly thinks he could improve his account by just adding history to his accounts. What Arendt wants is theorizing informed by social (political, moral) history.

Perry IV, "The Origin of An Inquiry: Evolutionary Epistemology in James' Pragmatism," 35-52. // Have scholars collectively failed to recognize the important role Darwin plays in James’s 1906-1907 Lowell Institute lectures on pragmatism? The goal of the paper is to elicit a “yes” verdict from the reader, although the author believes his study is insufficient for proving his intuition that Darwin played a central role in James’s thought in these lectures. The contention is that, given the importance of Pragmatism and the continued relevance of Darwinian science, it is worth the effort to read this classic James work in light of Darwin’s influence, in spite of Philip Weiner’s (and practically everyone else’s) lack of treatment when considering the relationship of Darwin and James. The paper presents evidence by analogy, authority, and synonymy, linking Darwin’s biological theory to James’s account of human knowledge presented in the Lowell Institute lectures.

Rector, "Revisioning Heidegger: Existentiell Crises and The Question of the Meaning of Being," 53-61. // Being and Time may be read as calling the reader to overcome her tendency to avoid recognizing nothingness and our pending death. Most commentators believe that Heidegger prevents an existential crisis from being a possible impetus to the essential confrontation. Contrary to that understanding, the author here posits that it is possible and consistent with Heidegger’s thought to hold that certain existential crises are happenings to our world, not just within our world. Falling in love pulls the ground out from under us and is really something that alters the axis of meaning for our world. The same goes for the experience of losing the beloved other. To the extent that such experiences dismantle our ontological assumptions (i.e. are not repressed), we can encounter nothingness and our not being. Angst is not the only route to take.

Thomson, "Hartmann, Kolb, Pippin and the Unhappy Consciousness," 63-76. // The author of this article critiques the exegesis offered in Neo-Kantian interpretations of Hegel coming from Klaus Hartmann, David Kolb, and Robert Pippin. They all suppose a thought/object dualism that Hegel rejects, and they all-too-easily “forgive” Hegel of philosophizing outside the bounds of the interpretation they use to describe his general thought. They offer interpretations of Hegel that answer Kantian transcendentalist questions, not ontological questions, which is in part due to their fixation on rigor, which binds them and limits their understanding. Even though the Logic is the most susceptible to a Kantian reading, the author argues for how such a reading still misses key aspects of the Logic. Importantly, Hegel’s hermeneutical guidance allows us to pick out elements in such misguided interpretations, in terms of alignment and misalignment with Hegel’s thought. If we turn to the Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, we see support for a monist reading of Hegel.
Advisors:
Goldblatt, David
Editors:
Bruce, Laura M.
Publisher:
Denison University Department of Philosophy
DATE ISSUED:
31-Aug-2011
PERMANENT LINK:
http://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/744; http://hdl.handle.net/2374
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
Episteme

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.advisorGoldblatt, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorGreeson, Michael P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJaniak, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.authorPerry, J. Ellis IVen_US
dc.contributor.authorRector, Paulen_US
dc.contributor.authorThomson, Kevinen_US
dc.contributor.editorBruce, Laura M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-31T17:49:52Zen
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-18T20:42:19Zen
dc.date.available2011-08-31T17:49:52Zen
dc.date.available2013-12-18T20:42:19Zen
dc.date.issued2011-08-31en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374.DEN/744en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2374en
dc.description.abstractGreeson, "Hobbes, Locke, and the State of Nature Theories: A Reassessment," 1-15. // The classic story told about modern political philosophy paints Hobbes and Locke as contrasting figures who have differing opinions about human psychology. The author of this article rejects such a picture and instead argues that Locke’s state of nature contains features that are strikingly similar to Hobbes’. The author reassesses the supposedly “egoist” Hobbes and the “civil” Locke. It becomes clear that Hobbes’ mechanism and rhetorical bent influence his description of the state of nature—the world without social arrangement. Locke, who is more direct and practical, depicts a state of nature that is actually pre-political and normative. Such differences mask the fact that each philosopher provides a compelling argument for the use of reason in politics—for the practical construction of political bodies. They both advocate a government designed to influence our natural passions and avoid the danger of war.en_US
dc.description.abstractJaniak, "Arendt and MacIntyre on the Enlightenment's Failure," 17-34. // Arendt and MacIntyre, who come from two competing branches of contemporary philosophy, surprisingly both believe that the Enlightenment failed in large part due to the emptiness of the so-called “Rights of Man” and that this failure led the late-20th century to be a “post” era. But their critiques are distinct and beg comparison. The author endeavors to show that Arendt is better able to respond to MacIntyre than he to her, given the political—not philosophical—argument put forth by Arendt. The paper divides into four sections: the two overviews of each’s arguments concerning the Enlightenment, and each of their separate, imagined critiques/replies. Arendt, who supplements her social and political work with more philosophy in books like The Human Condition and On Revolution, can satisfy MacIntyre’s request for more broad philosophical influence. Arendt’s critique is deeper. MacIntyre claims to be a historicist, yet his documented response to Edel’s critique of his approach to history shows us that MacIntyre mistakenly thinks he could improve his account by just adding history to his accounts. What Arendt wants is theorizing informed by social (political, moral) history.en_US
dc.description.abstractPerry IV, "The Origin of An Inquiry: Evolutionary Epistemology in James' Pragmatism," 35-52. // Have scholars collectively failed to recognize the important role Darwin plays in James’s 1906-1907 Lowell Institute lectures on pragmatism? The goal of the paper is to elicit a “yes” verdict from the reader, although the author believes his study is insufficient for proving his intuition that Darwin played a central role in James’s thought in these lectures. The contention is that, given the importance of Pragmatism and the continued relevance of Darwinian science, it is worth the effort to read this classic James work in light of Darwin’s influence, in spite of Philip Weiner’s (and practically everyone else’s) lack of treatment when considering the relationship of Darwin and James. The paper presents evidence by analogy, authority, and synonymy, linking Darwin’s biological theory to James’s account of human knowledge presented in the Lowell Institute lectures.en_US
dc.description.abstractRector, "Revisioning Heidegger: Existentiell Crises and The Question of the Meaning of Being," 53-61. // Being and Time may be read as calling the reader to overcome her tendency to avoid recognizing nothingness and our pending death. Most commentators believe that Heidegger prevents an existential crisis from being a possible impetus to the essential confrontation. Contrary to that understanding, the author here posits that it is possible and consistent with Heidegger’s thought to hold that certain existential crises are happenings to our world, not just within our world. Falling in love pulls the ground out from under us and is really something that alters the axis of meaning for our world. The same goes for the experience of losing the beloved other. To the extent that such experiences dismantle our ontological assumptions (i.e. are not repressed), we can encounter nothingness and our not being. Angst is not the only route to take.en_US
dc.description.abstractThomson, "Hartmann, Kolb, Pippin and the Unhappy Consciousness," 63-76. // The author of this article critiques the exegesis offered in Neo-Kantian interpretations of Hegel coming from Klaus Hartmann, David Kolb, and Robert Pippin. They all suppose a thought/object dualism that Hegel rejects, and they all-too-easily “forgive” Hegel of philosophizing outside the bounds of the interpretation they use to describe his general thought. They offer interpretations of Hegel that answer Kantian transcendentalist questions, not ontological questions, which is in part due to their fixation on rigor, which binds them and limits their understanding. Even though the Logic is the most susceptible to a Kantian reading, the author argues for how such a reading still misses key aspects of the Logic. Importantly, Hegel’s hermeneutical guidance allows us to pick out elements in such misguided interpretations, in terms of alignment and misalignment with Hegel’s thought. If we turn to the Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, we see support for a monist reading of Hegel.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherDenison University Department of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEpistemeen_US
dc.subjectHobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.en_US
dc.subjectLocke, John, 1632-1704.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectModernen_US
dc.subjectState of Natureen_US
dc.subjectPsychologyen_US
dc.subjectSocietyen_US
dc.subjectWaren_US
dc.subjectMacIntyre, Alasdair C.en_US
dc.subjectArendt, Hannah, 1906-1975.en_US
dc.subjectEnlightenmenten_US
dc.subjectModernityen_US
dc.subjectRighten_US
dc.subjectHolocausten_US
dc.subjectMoralityen_US
dc.subjectHistoricismen_US
dc.subjectJames, William, 1842-1910.en_US
dc.subjectDarwin, Charles, 1809-1882.en_US
dc.subjectPragmatism.en_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary Epistemologyen_US
dc.subjectCommon Senseen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionen_US
dc.subjectBiologyen_US
dc.subjectAnalogyen_US
dc.subjectInquiryen_US
dc.subjectHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.en_US
dc.subjectPhenomenology.en_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectDaseinen_US
dc.subjectDeathen_US
dc.subjectAngsten_US
dc.subjectLoveen_US
dc.subjectNothingnessen_US
dc.subjectHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831.en_US
dc.subjectHartmann, Klaus, 1925 Sept. 5-en_US
dc.subjectKolb, Daviden_US
dc.subjectPippin, Robert B., 1948-en_US
dc.subjectMetaphysics.en_US
dc.subjectHermeneuticsen_US
dc.subjectLogicen_US
dc.subjectUnhappinessen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectNeo-Kantianismen_US
dc.subjectIdealismen_US
dc.subjectMonismen_US
dc.titleEpisteme Vol. Ven_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.catalogerWalt, Seanen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardBaldwin, Kellyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardCollier, Christopher P.en_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardDunham, Treyen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardGilmore, Sethen_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardLiebson, Matten_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardLubitz, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardMatson, Dereken_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardParrack, Edwarden_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardPotts, Granten_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardRussell, Marken_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardSahin, Cenken_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardTimura, Christopheren_US
dc.contributor.editorialboardWebster, Nicken_US
dc.equipment.digitizingMinolta PS7000en_US
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